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I fear for the future. I fear for the liberty and equality of the mil-
lions of women who have lived and come of age in the 16 years since
Roe was decided.'
On July 3, 1989, a plurality of the Supreme Court of the United States
issued an opinion in Webster v. Reproductive Health Services2 which,
while not overturning Roe v. Wade,' shook the foundations of women's
constitutional rights of liberty and equality. Three Justices indicated that
they believed the trimester system set forth in Roe should be abandoned,
while another Justice said that he would explicitly overrule Roe. Webster
thus becomes the most recent and most dangerous attack on reproductive
rights for women since Roe was decided in 1973."
In this paper, we will examine how legal theories of privacy and equal
protection have been applied to cases involving women's reproductive free-
dom. We will assess some of the past and current assaults on women's
reproductive freedom. The conclusion will suggest that interpretations of
privacy and equal protection have not been adequate to safeguard
women's control over their bodies and that an autonomy analysis would
achieve better protection of women's reproductive freedom.
I. OVERVIEW
During the 1960's and 1970's, women became increasingly active in all
aspects of society, demanding that they be treated as equals and given the
power to decide whether or not to procreate. The desire to achieve both
t Authors' names are in alphabetical order. We want to thank Mark Blumberg, John Beardsley,
Louise Zanar, Kate Martin, Susan Persons, Phyllis Palmer and the women at the 1988 Feminism
and Legal Theory conference for their insights and suggestions.
1. Webster v. Reproductive Health Services, - U.S. -, 109 S.Ct. 3040, 3067 (1989) (Black-
mun, J., dissenting).
2. - U.S. -, 109 S.Ct. 3040 (1989).
3. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
4. This paper, presented at the 1988 Feminism and Legal Theory Conference, was written before
the Webster decision. In August 1989, we incorporated Webster into our paper. Webster represents a
significant threat to reproductive freedom and an analysis of that decision could easily be the topic of
an entire paper. Given the broad scope of this paper, however, we have had to limit our discussion of
Webster.
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equality in the workplace and the power to make reproductive choices
represented challenges by women to their traditional roles, particularly
those of mother, homemaker, and wife. The initial response of legislatures
and courts to women's demands for increased power over their lives was
tentative acquiescence. In 1971, for the first time in its history, the U.S.
Supreme Court held that a gender-based statute violated the Equal Pro-
tection Clause.' In Reed, the Court struck down a statute compelling a
preference for males to administer estates and held that laws treating sim-
ilarly situated men and women dissimilarly violated the Equal Protection
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Two years later, in Roe v. Wade,6
the Court held that among the "personal rights that can be deemed 'fun-
damental' or 'implicit in the concept of ordered liberty,' "' is a woman's
decision whether or not to terminate her pregnancy. Roe marked the first
time the doctrine of privacy, with roots in the First, Fourth, Fifth, Ninth
and Fourteenth Amendments of the Constitution,8 was used to assure the
reproductive rights specific to women. Reed and Roe reflected the Court's
recognition of the changing role of women in our society.
In the 1980's, government institutions, most notably the Supreme Court
in Webster, are joining what appears to be a "backlash" against women's
empowerment. A movie review in Ms. argues that: "not since the late
forties have movies pushed home, hearth and motherhood with such fer-
vor."9 Such films as Fatal Attraction, The Big Easy and Baby Boom, de-
pict "unmarried working women as deficient in humanity,"10 the corol-
lary being that women become "human" only through motherhood. To
cite another example, "surrogacy" has become a profitable business over
the last twelve years, despite the fact that there has been no increase in
infertility since 1965 among married couples or the general population."
A Ms. special report states that "the assumption perhaps inherent in the
flourishing infertility industry that a child is worth having at any cost can
glorify motherhood to the detriment of other roles that women have fought
hard to perform."' 2 More evidence of the "backlash" against women is an
increasing effort to get the public to perceive the fetus as a separate legal
entity from the pregnant woman, with greater rights than the pregnant
woman. This phenomenon caused the director of the ACLU Women's
Rights Project to remark:
5. Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71 (1971).
6. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
7. Id. at 152.
8. Id.
9. Haskell, Hollywood Madonnas, Ms., May 1988, at 84.
10. Stone, The New Femme Fatale, Ms., Dec. 1987, at 78, 79.
11. See U.S. CONGRESS OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT, INFERTILITY: MEDICAL AND
SOCIAL CHOICES, May 1988 (on file with author).
12. Thorn, Special Report: Dilemmas of the New Birth Technologies, Ms., May 1988, at 70.
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[W]e will need a new warning in addition to the ones on cigarette
packages, in bars, and on non-prescription drugs. "Warning: preg-
nancy is dangerous to your constitutional rights. You will lose the
rights to liberty, to equality and to privacy."13
Like many segments of our society, the courts and legislatures have
been ambivalent about and even hostile to the change in women's roles
over the last twenty years. Nowhere has this ambivalence been more ap-
parent than in the area of reproductive freedom. Consequently, in no
other area of the law are women more vulnerable to new restrictions and
erosion of their hard-won gains. Like Sylvia Law, we believe that since
Roe women's struggle for control of their bodies has been transformed into
debates about medical practice and moral and religious views of the per-
sonhood of the fetus.""' Women's lives and sex-based equality have be-
come secondary issues. 15 As will be discussed, there have been countless
attempts to overturn and restrict Roe in the last fifteen years. Women
today face a "theory of fetal rights" that threatens to subordinate women's
fundamental rights to presumed "rights" of the fetus and to make adver-
saries of a woman and her fetus. By viewing the fetus as distinct from the
woman, this theory undercuts traditional assumptions that the pregnant
woman is entitled, like all persons, to the dignity and respect to make
decisions for herself and consequently, the fetus. "Fathers' rights" cases
are another example of recent attempts to intrude on a woman's right of
autonomy.
II. TRADITIONAL LEGAL APPLICATIONS OF PRIVACY AND EQUAL
PROTECTION HAVE NOT PROVED ADEQUATE FOR WOMEN'S
REPRODUCTIVE FREEDOM
Noted feminist Catharine MacKinnon states that "the specific exclusion
or absence of women and women's concerns from the definition and design
of the legal system since its founding, combined with its determined ad-
herence to precedent,""6 leaves women with a problem of systemic dimen-
sion. And in no other area of the law does this problem have more of an
oppressive and discriminatory potential than in reproductive freedom. The
success of the fetal rights advocates and the many attempts to dilute Roe
highlight the limits of the privacy doctrine, as currently applied, to secure
for women the constitutional guarantee of freedom from unwarranted gov-
ernment intervention.
In 1965, the Supreme Court held in Griswold v. Connecticut 7 that
13. Katz-Pinzler, Jailed Because She Is Pregnant, Wash. Post, Aug. 21, 1988, at C8, col. 1.
14. Law, Rethinking Sex and the Constitution, 132 U. PA. L. Rav. 955, 986 (1984).
15. Id.
16. C. MAcKINNON, FEMINISM UNMODIFIED 167 (1987).
17. 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
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there are certain privacy rights found in the penumbras of the First,
Third, Fourth, Fifth, and Ninth Amendments that are "fundamental,"
and that the Court must look to the " 'traditions and [collective] conscience
of our people' to determine whether a principle is 'so rooted [there] ... as
to be ranked as fundamental.' "1" The Court held in Griswold that the
right to marital privacy meant that the state could not intrude into deci-
sions regarding use of contraceptives in a marriage.
In Eisenstadt v. Baird," a case which concerned the use of contracep-
tives by unmarried persons, the Supreme Court extended the scope of this
fundamental right by holding that "if the right of privacy means anything,
it is the right of the individual, married or single, to be free from unwar-
ranted government intrusion into matters so fundamentally affecting a
person as the decision whether to bear or beget a child."' Noted constitu-
tional scholar Laurence Tribe explains, "[T]he effect of Eisenstadt v.
Baird was to single out as decisive in Griswold the element of reproduc-
tive autonomy, something that was made clear in 1977 in Carey v. Popu-
lation Services International.""
To the extent that our society has always viewed the family and home
as a zone of privacy, these cases accurately reflect traditions "rooted in our
national conscience."22 When, however, the Supreme Court extended this
right of privacy in Roe to include a woman's right to choose whether or
not to terminate her pregnancy, some critics felt the decision went beyond
what many believed to be a principle "so rooted as to be ranked funda-
mental."23 While reproductive freedom for women may not have been a
particularly strong tradition in our society in 1973,24 rights to marital pri-
18. Id. at 493 (quoting Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97, 105 (1934)).
19. 405 U.S. 438 (1972).
20. Id. at 453.
21. L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1339 (2d ed. 1988).
22. The traditional zone of privacy has been the family, a zone so protected that a man's home
was said to be his castle. Brandeis and Warren, The Right to Privacy, 5 HARV. L. REV. 193, 220
(1890). However, this notion of protection for the traditional male-dominated family is changing, as
evidenced by laws criminalizing spouse abuse, child abuse and non-payment of child support.
23. See e.g., Ely, The Wages of Crying Wolf. A Comment on Roe v. Wade, 82 YALE L. J. 920
(1973); see also, Bork, Neutral Principles and Some First Amendment Problems, 47 IND. L. J. 1
(1971).
24. The restrictive criminal abortion laws in effect in a majority of the states in 1973 were en-
acted, for the most part, in the latter half of the 19th century. These laws, generally proscribing
abortion or its attempt at any time during pregnancy except when necessary to preserve the pregnant
woman's life, were not of ancient or common-law origin. In fact, in Roe, the Court wrote:
[A]t common law, at the time of the adoption of our Constitution, and throughout the major
portion of the 19th century, abortion was viewed with less disfavor than under most American
statutes currently in effect. ... [A] woman enjoyed a substantially broader right to terminate a
pregnancy than she does in most States today. At least with respect to the early stage of preg-
nancy, and very possibly without such a limitation, the opportunity to make this choice was
present in this country well into the 19th century. Even later, the law continued for some time
to treat less punitively an abortion procured in early pregnancy.
410 U.S. at 140-141. For a history of abortion laws in the United States, see K. LUKER, ABORTION
AND THE POLITICS OF MOTHERHOOD (1984) and C. SMITH-ROSENBERG, DISORDERLY CONDUCT
(1985).
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vacy, bodily integrity"' and self-determination" for all people were.
Roe v. Wade was tremendously important for women's freedom. For
the first time in our history, the Court recognized a right specifically ena-
bling women to gain a degree of control over their bodies and lives, to
have a right of autonomy similar to men.
When we talk about women's rights, we can get all the rights in the
world-the right to vote, the right to go to school-and none of them
means a doggone thing if we don't own the flesh we stand in, if we
can't control what happens to us, if the whole course of our lives can
be changed by somebody else that can get us pregnant by accident, or
by deceit, or by force. So I consider the right to elective abortion,
whether you dream of doing it or not, is [sic] the cornerstone of the
women's movement ....
Roe held that in the first trimester of pregnancy, the woman, with her
physician, has a constitutional right to choose whether or not to terminate
her pregnancy. The constitutional right continues throughout the preg-
nancy, but throughout the second trimester is weighed against the state's
interest in the woman's health, and throughout the third trimester is
weighed against the state's compelling interests in the potential human life
and the woman's health. Regarding the fetus, Roe held that, "All this
together .. .persuades us that the word 'person' as used in the Four-
teenth Amendment does not include the unborn."'28
Additionally, Roe held that the state's interest in the fetus never out-
weighs its interest in the mother's health. The Supreme Court reinforced
its holding that there can be no trade-off between the fetus and the
mother's health in Thornburgh v. American College of Obstetricians and
Gynecologists.29 In deciding Thornburgh, the Court wrote:
The Court of Appeals ruled that Section 3210(b) was unconstitu-
tional because it required a "trade-off" between the woman's health
and fetal survival, and failed to require that maternal health be the
physician's paramount consideration . . . .We agree with the
Court of Appeals and therefore find the statute to be facially
invalid.30
25. "ITIhe overriding function of the Fourth Amendment is to protect personal privacy and integ-
rity against unwarranted intrusion by the state." Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 767 (1966).
26. See Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 478 (1928).
27. LUKER, supra note 24, at 97 (quoting one of the first women recruited to the Society for
Humane Abortions).
28. 410 U.S. at 158.
29. 476 U.S. 747 (1986). (Thornburgh addressed Section 3210(b) of the Pennsylvania Abortion
Control Act which established the degree of care for post-viability abortions.)
30. Id. at 768-69 (citing Colautti v. Franklin, 439 U.S. 379 (1979)) (recognizing undesirability of
"trade-off' between the woman's health and additional percentage points of fetal survival").
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Despite the fact that Roe and its progeny may be the most empowering
court decisions for women, neither Roe nor subsequent cases discuss its
impact on gender equality. Professor Sylvia Law remarks that in Roe, the
"rhetoric of privacy . . .blunts our ability to focus on the fact that it is
women who are oppressed when abortion is denied." 1 Roe would have
better secured women's reproductive freedom had it acknowledged its sex-
specific impact and its contribution to achieving gender equality. Perhaps
because it did not acknowledge issues of equality, or perhaps because
there is a lack of consensus on the extent of privacy, Roe has been fre-
quently criticized and its original mandate has been eroded.
Current equal protection analysis has also failed to secure for women
the right to be treated as equal citizens. In Professor Kenneth Karst's
article on equal citizenship, he states: "Equality, as an abstraction, may
be value-neutral, but the Fourteenth Amendment is not."' 2 At the core of
the Amendment, particularly the Equal Protection Clause, is "a principle
of equal citizenship, which presumptively guarantees to each individual
the right to be treated by the organized society as a respected, responsible,
and participating member." 3 In its application, the Equal Protection
Clause will "operate to prohibit the society from inflicting a 'status-harm'
on members of a group because of their group membership." '34 By limiting
or prohibiting women's opportunities to make decisions about their bodies
and lives, the courts ignore this principle of equal citizenship.
Although the Supreme Court has repeatedly held that a middle level of
scrutiny be applied to gender classifications, and that any sex-based dis-
crimination be supported by "exceedingly persuasive justification . . .
which does not itself reflect archaic and stereotypic notions, '"" it has not
applied this heightened scrutiny to classifications based on pregnancy. 6
Because pregnancy is unique to women and there is no male analogue to
women's childbearing ability, the Court has found that men and women
are not "similarly situated." Thus, reproductive-based classifications need
only meet the most minimal standard of review, leaving women's repro-
ductive freedom virtually unprotected under the Equal Protection Clause.
The effect of the Court's current interpretation of equal potection analysis
31. Law, supra note 14, at 1020. The Webster plurality opinions barely mention women at all.
Justice Scalia's opinion does not mention women once. These omissions led Justice Blackmun to
remark, "[o]f the aspirations and settled understandings of American women, of the inevitable and
brutal consequences of what it is doing, the tough-approach plurality utters not a word. This silence
is callous." Webster v. Reproductive Health Services, 109 S.Ct. 3040, 3078 (1989) (Blackmun, J.,
dissenting).
32. Karst, Foreword: Equal Citizenship Under The Fourteenth Amendment, 91 HARV. L. REv.
1, 4 (1977).
33. Id.
34. Id. at 8.
35. Mississippi University for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718, 725 (1982). The Supreme Court's
decision in Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976), created a level of middle-tier scrutiny for sex-based
classifications where men and women are similarly situated.
36. See Geduldig v. Aiello, 417 U.S. 484 (1974).
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is that when legislative classifications are based on "true" biological dif-
ferences between men and women, then men and women are considered
not similarly situated with regard to the legislative ends. Therefore, there
is no Fourteenth Amendment violation since gender classifications based
on "real" differences do not offend the Court's narrowly defined and
male-based equality model.
Examples of cases in which the court has used this kind of analysis are,
among others, Michael M. v. Superior Court 7 (involving statutory rape:
male and female teenagers not similarly situated with respect to sexual
intercourse); Rostker v. Goldberg8 (because women cannot go into com-
bat, men and women are not similarly situated with respect to the Mili-
tary Selective Service Act); and Parham v. Hughes 9 (mothers of illegiti-
mate children and fathers of illegitimate children are not similarly
situated with respect to their child's wrongful death benefits).
The most extreme example of this line of cases is Geduldig v. Aiello.41
Geduldig involved a California state disability insurance plan which cov-
ered virtually all disabilities except pregnancy. The Supreme Court put a
new twist on the similarly situated argument by finding that, in fact, men
and women were being treated equally for insurance purposes; it was only
pregnant persons who were being treated differently. Men and women
were treated the same for all risks covered in that neither men nor women
could recover benefits for pregnancy. The Court therefore found that dis-
crimination on the basis of pregnancy is not gender-based discrimination,
so there was no need for heightened scrutiny.
In General Electric Co. v. Gilbert,4' this same analysis was extended to
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act.42 Gilbert involved General Electric
Company's exclusion of pregnancy from a general coverage disability
plan. The Supreme Court held that discrimination against pregnancy was
not gender-based discrimination, and thus, not unlawful under Title VII.
Congress disagreed and passed the Pregnancy Discrimination Act4 in re-
sponse to Gilbert.44
In a later case, Nashville v. Satty,45 the Supreme Court, prior to the
passage of the Pregnancy Discrimination Act, found that an employer vio-
lated Title VII by denying women accrued seniority leave if their absence
was due to pregnancy. In that case, Justice Rehnquist, in distinguishing
37. 450 U.S. 464 (1981).
38. 453 U.S. 57 (1981).
39. 441 U.S. 347 (1979).
40. 417 U.S. 484 (1974).
41. 429 U.S. 125 (1976).
42. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2000e-17 (1982) (codified as amended by Equal Employment Opportu-
nity Act of 1972).
43. Pub. L. No. 95-555, 92 Stat. 2076 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k) (1982)).
44. But see California Fed. Say. and Loan Ass'n v. Guerra, 479 U.S. 272 (1987) (Title VII does
not preempt California's Pregnancy Discrimination Act).
45. 434 U.S. 136 (1977).
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the decision from Gilbert, and therefore Geduldig, said as follows: "Here,
by comparison, petitioner has not merely refused to extend a benefit to
women that men cannot and do not receive, but has imposed on women a
substantial burden that men need not suffer."' 6
In cases where the Supreme Court can perceive a clear male analogue,
it has applied heightened scrutiny and found gender-based differences in
treatment a violation of the Fourteenth Amendment's Equal Protection
Clause. So, for instance, in cases involving equal pay in the military,"7
college admissions,' 8 estate administration,"9 Social Security benefits, 60
and parental support,51 where men and women were treated differently,
the Court found equal protection violations. Specifically, as soon as
women's reproductive capacity becomes an issue, their opportunity to have
the same life options as men are restricted."
III. SUMMARY OF THESIS: THE RIGHT OF AUTONOMY IS A
FUNDAMENTAL RIGHT FOR WOMEN AND MEN
Although women have been "fit" into a legal construction that was not
developed to deal with "gender-based classification and reproductive au-
tonomy," 53 there is existing law which, if appropriately applied, will help
to secure women's reproductive freedom. Our thesis is that there is a fun-
damental right to autonomy guaranteed by the Constitution and that men
and women are similarly situated with respect to this right to autonomy. 5'
Thus, the recent restrictions on women's reproductive freedom violate this
fundamental right under due process analysis and under equal protection
analysis. Once it is understood that autonomy is a fundamental right, due
process prohibits the government from putting restrictions on women's
46. Id. at 142.
47. Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677 (1973).
48. Mississippi Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718 (1982).
49. Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71 (1971).
50. Califano v. Goldfarb, 430 U.S. 199 (1977).
51. Stanton v. Stanton, 421 U.S. 7 (1975).
52. But see California Fed. Say. and Loan Ass'n v. Guerra, 479 U.S. 272 (1987).
53. Ginsburg, Some Thoughts on Autonomy and Equality in Relation to Roe v. Wade, 63 N. C.
L. REV. 375 (1985).
54. The Ninth Amendment obviously does not create federally enforceable rights. It merely
says, 'The enumeration in the Constitution, of certain rights, shall not be construed to deny or
disparage others retained by the people.' But a catalogue of these rights includes customary,
traditional, and time-honored rights, amenities, privileges, and immunities that come within
the sweep of 'the Blessings of Liberty' mentioned in the preamble to the Constitution. Many of
them, in my view, come within the meaning of the term 'liberty' as used in the Fourteenth
Amendment . . . First is the autonomous control over the development and expression of
one's intellect, interests, tastes and personality.
Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179, 210-11 (1973) (Douglas, J., concurring) (emphasis added).
Gerety adds that: "Privacy will be defined here as an autonomy or control over the intimacies of
personal identity. Autonomy, identity, and intimacy are all necessary (and together normally suffi-
cient) for the proper invocation of the concept of privacy." Gerety, Redefining Privacy, 12 HARV. C.
R.- C. L. L. REV. 233, 236 (1977).
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freedom unless such restrictions are necessary to meet a compelling state
interest and are the most limited alternatives available.
Additionally, sex-based access to autonomy constitutes a serious equal
protection violation because equal protection requires that women's and
men's right of autonomy be equally guaranteed. Recognizing that men
and women are similarly situated with respect to the constitutional right
of autonomy requires the courts to evaluate whether there is an "exceed-
ingly persuasive justification" for the restriction which does not "itself re-
flect archaic and stereotypic notions."55 Once the fundamental right of au-
tonomy is recognized, it has two effects on an equal protection analysis.
Any restriction on autonomy which operates differently with respect to
pregnant women than to others will be subject to strict scrutiny because
there is governmental infringement of a fundamental right. In addition,
because men and women are similarly situated with respect to the right of
autonomy, properly analyzed, restrictions on the autonomy of pregnant
women are unconstitutionally sex-based and subject, at a minimum, to
middle-tier scrutiny.
Long recognized by the courts, though not specifically articulated as
such in recent constitutional analysis, the right of autonomy is a "positive"
right to bodily integrity and self-determination. It is also a "negative"
right, used to "define some reliable limits upon the state's power to shape
the behavior of individuals and groups, whether by controlling the exper-
iences available to them or by regulating the experiences with which their
choices confront others."5 In the late 19th century, the Supreme Court
wrote:
No right is held more sacred, or is more carefully guarded, by the
common law, than the right of every individual to the possession and
control of his own person, free from all restraint or interference of
others, unless by clear and unquestionable authority of law. "
In this century, the courts have also set limits on the degree to which
the government can intrude on personal autonomy, finding such rights as
the "right to be let alone," 8  a right of bodily integrity,59 and a right to
55. Mississippi University for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. at 724, 725 (1982).
56. L. TRIBE, supra note 21, at 1304.
57. Union Pac. Ry. v. Botsford, 141 U.S. 250, 251 (1891).
58. Olmstead, 277 U.S. at 478 (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
59. Winston v. Lee, 470 U.S. 753, 760 (1985). As discussed later in this paper, Winston is one of
many Fourth Amendment criminal law cases upholding a person's interest in privacy and security
against a competing societal interest in physical invasion of the body to retrieve criminal evidence.
Gerety's comments on autonomy also express this right to bodily integrity:
All of this comes in the end to control over the most basic vehicle of selfhood: the bodies. For
control over the body is the first form of autonomy and the necessary condition, for those who
are not saints or stoics, of all later forms. Any plausible definition of privacy, then, whatever
the sources of its normative commitments, must take the body as its first and most basic refer-
ence for control over personal identity.
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reproductive decision making."0 As recently as 1986, the Supreme Court
has stated that:
Our cases long have recognized that the Constitution embodies a
promise that a certain private sphere of individual liberty will be
kept largely beyond the reach of government .... That promise ex-
tends to women as well as to men."1
While this promise extends to women, we are unable to partake fully of
it because of the restrictions on reproductive freedom. Surely, if "the right
of every individual to the possession and control of his own person,"62 is
to have any real meaning, it must include the right of a woman to decide
whether and how to have a child. It must allow women to "determine the
uses of their own bodies.""
We offer the autonomy analysis as a way to focus on a substantive
aspect of the notion of privacy." While the notion of privacy as a right is
widely accepted, there remains a lack of consensus on precisely what that
right protects.
Now, more than a decade after the Griswold decision, the moral ur-
gency and even the legal viability of some such right [of privacy] is
no longer in much doubt. The problem with the right to privacy is
not its uncertainty or invalidity generally but its lack of a specific
identity in the foreground of legal rights and remedies, particularly
under the Constitution. We now know full well that we have a right
to privacy in some such broad sense as Justice Brandeis argued in
his Olmstead dissent, but what that right comes to in conflict with
other rights and interests we cannot easily say-any better than the
Supreme Court itself."
Privacy, as "a concept and a right, stands in great need of the few
certainties and limitations that definition affords us." 6 Because autonomy
is one of those few certainties, we believe it is a more precise term than
privacy with respect to reproductive freedom.
Gerety, supra note 54, at 266.
60. Roe, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
61. Thornburgh, 476 U.S. at 772.
62. Union Pac., 141 U.S. at 251.
63. Brief of Appellant at 16, Doe v. Smith No. 84 A01-8804-CV-00112 (Ind. Ct. App. filed April
29, 1988) [hereinafter Doe v. Smith Appellant Brief].
64. Our approach is therefore similar to Kenneth Karst's attempt to anchor the notion of equality
through use of equal citizenship as the substantive content of the equal protection clause. Karst, supra
note 32.
65. Gerety, supra note 54, at 244 (emphasis in original).
66. Id. at 296.
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IV. LIMITATIONS OF CURRENT LAW: ACCESS TO ABORTION,
FATHER'S RIGHTS AND FETAL RIGHTS
The increasing threats to women's reproductive freedom illuminate the
shortcomings of current applications of privacy analysis and equal protec-
tion and highlight the need for recognition of a woman's right to auton-
omy. For sixteen years, there have been attempts to limit the reach of Roe
and overturn the decision. Among the most successful attempts to chal-
lenge Roe was Webster v. Reproductive Health Services."7 In Webster,
state-employed health professionals and private nonprofit corporations
providing abortion services brought suit for declaratory and injunctive re-
lief challenging the constitutionality of the Missouri statute regulating the
performance of abortion. The preamble of the statute stated that "[tihe
life of each human being begins at conception" and that "[u]nborn chil-
dren have protectable interests in life, health and well-being." 8 The stat-
ute prohibits the use of public employees or facilities to perform or assist
an abortion not necessary to save the mother's life and prohibits the use of
public funds, employees or facilities for the purposes of encouraging or
counseling a woman to have an abortion not necessary to save her life.
The statute also requires that a physician must determine if the fetus is
viable if there is a possibility that the woman is twenty or more weeks
pregnant.
The Court upheld these provisions, using much of the same analysis
and nearly identical language found in Harris v. McCrae69 to defend the
prohibition on public employees and facilities. In Webster, Justice Rehn-
quist wrote that "the State's decision here to use public facilities and staff
to encourage childbirth over abortion 'places no governmental obstacle in
67. 109 S.Ct. 3040 (1989).
68. Id. at 3049. The plurality wrote that this provision does not regulate abortion or interfere
with a woman's decision, but simply expresses a value judgment made by the state legislature. How-
ever, as evidenced by an August, 1989 decision by Judge George Gerhard, an Associate Circuit Judge
in the St. Louis County courts, the Supreme Court's "approval" of this provision has not gone unno-
ticed. Gerhard invoked this provision to acquit anti-abortion protestors of trespassing charges. The
judge allowed the protestors to use a "justification defense" - to say they had broken a lesser law to
prevent a greater evil. Brotman, Abortion Decision Fallout Gathers, Chic. Trib., Aug. 20, 1989, at
Al.
69. 448 U.S. 297, 315-17 (1980). In Harris, the Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of
the Hyde Amendment. The Hyde Amendment prohibits the use of Medicaid funds to pay for abor-
tions, unless the life of the pregnant woman would be endangered if the fetus were carried to term.
Every other medically necessary procedure may be funded when the woman is categorically eligible.
Medical necessity is not sufficient, however, in the case of abortion and funding is denied where the
woman's life is not threatened. Thus, a great many women are denied reproductive freedom because
they cannot afford abortions. The language of the law reads: "None of the funds contained in this Act
shall be used to perform abortions except where the life of the mother would be endangered if the
fetus were carried to term." Since 1977, a version of this amendment has been included in every
Labor, HHS or Labor, HHS and Education appropriations bill. The language of the original amend-
ment is included in the FY 1989 bill. See Departments of Labor, Health and Human Services, and
Education and Related Agencies Appropriation Act, 1989, Pub. L. No. 100-436, §204, 102 Stat.
1681, 1699 (1988).
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the path of a woman who chooses to terminate her pregnancy.' "0 He
concludes that "[n]othing in the Constitution requires States to enter or
remain in the business of performing abortions. 71
This analysis reflects a total lack of concern for both a woman's access
to her constitutional right of privacy and for her health, in which the state
is said to have a compelling interest. Most of the hospitals in Missouri are
publicly funded. Even if it is medically necessary for a woman to have an
abortion, under the statute it is not likely that she will be able to have the
operation performed in a hospital in Missouri.
McCrae and Webster both reveal the Supreme Court's lack of commit-
ment to protecting women's constitutional rights. Although extremely
opaque, the Webster plurality's decision, in effect, discards the framework
of Roe without showing "what, if anything, was wrong with the landmark
decision being gutted."'72 By calling abortion a " 'politically divisive' "17 3
issue, better left to the legislative process, Justice Rehnquist makes clear
his own reluctance to secure for women their constitutional rights. That
an issue is politically divisive should not deter the Court from protecting
the constitutional rights of individuals.
Congress appears to be equally unconcerned with women's right to re-
productive autonomy, evidenced by its continued support of the Hyde
Amendment. Since 1973, hundreds of bills have been introduced in Con-
gress aimed at overturning or limiting the reach of Roe. 4 In passing the
FY 1989 District of Columbia Appropriations Act,78 Congress, for the
first time, stipulated that the District of Columbia could not use any of its
local funds to pay for abortions, unless the life of the pregnant woman
would be endangered if the fetus were carried to term. Thus, since the
District of Columbia is also prohibited by the Hyde Amendment from
using federal funds to pay for abortions, the District is left without any
funding for abortions for indigent women.
The executive branch, as well as a majority of states, have followed the
examples set by the Supreme Court and Congress. The executive branch's
tenacity on this issue is demonstrated by the Reagan Administration's reg-
ulations proposing a drastic revision of long standing rules relating to Ti-
tle X (the federally funded family-planning program), 76 issued after nu-
70. Webster, 109 S.Ct. at 3052 (citing Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 315 (1980)).
71. Webster, 109 S.Ct. at 3052.
72. Dellinger, The Abortion Decision: Monument to Confusion, Wash. Post, July 9, 1989, at Al.
73. Webster, 109 S.Ct. at 3058 (citing Justice Blackmun's dissent).
74. "Within the decade after Roe v. Wade was decided almost 500 bills relating to abortion in
some way were introduced in Congress. The greater number of these proposals have sought to restrict
the availability of abortions, although a few measures have been introduced to make abortions more
widely available." Carr, Congressional Research Service Issue Brief, "Abortion: Legislative Control,"
Feb. 13, 1989, at 1.
75. See District of Columbia Appropriations Act, 1989, Pub. L. No. 100-436, § 117, 102 Stat.
2269, 2269-9 (1988).
76. Public Health Service Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 300-300-a-8 (1982).
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merous Title X anti-abortion amendments failed to pass Congress. The
regulations:
prohibit recipients of Title X funds from providing abortion counsel-
ing or referrals, require that grant recipients physically and finan-
cially separate Title X-funded activities from any activities that pro-
vide or discuss abortions, and forbid grant recipients from lobbying
for, distributing information about, or in any way advocating
abortion."
However, federal district courts in Denver, Colorado and Boston, Mas-
sachusetts have enjoined the Department of Health and Human Services
from enforcing the regulations.7 8 The decision of the New York Federal
District Court to enjoin the regulations has been vacated.79 All of these
decisions have been appealed.
States have also passed statutes regulating abortion access. For instance,
Minnesota requires a minor to:
notify both parents at least forty-eight hours before a planned abor-
tion or demonstrate to a court in an expedited confidential proceed-
ing either that she is 'mature and capable of giving informed consent'
or that the performance of an abortion without such notification
would be in her 'best interests.'80
One of the most extreme threats to a woman's right of autonomy has
manifested itself in the form of "fathers' rights" litigation.8 In 1988, indi-
vidual men sought and obtained temporary restraining orders (TRO's) in
a number of states, including Pennsylvania, Utah, Indiana and Minne-
77. Capitol Boxscore, CONGRESSIONAL QUARTERLY, Feb. 20, 1988, at 384-385.
78. Massachusetts v. Bowen, 679 F. Supp. 137 (D. Mass. 1988); Planned Parenthood Fed'n of
Am. v. Bowen, 680 F. Supp. 1465 (D. Colo. 1988).
79. New York v. Bowen, 690 F. Supp. 1261 (S.D.N.Y. 1988).
80. Hodgson v. Minnesota, 853 F.2d 1425, 1453 (8th Cir. 1988), cert. granted 109 S.Ct. 3240
(summarizing applicable Minnesota minors abortion law, MINN. STAT. ANN. §§ 144.343(2)-(7)
(West 1987)).
81. Surprisingly, the courts and the media have treated the claim of fathers' rights as if it were
a new phenomenon rather than the repackaging of an old and long discarded social and legal
construct. Throughout much of history, law has accepted and reinforced the theory of 'father-
right.' In Augustus' Rome, the law acknowledged the patria potestas, the power of the father
over life and death of the members of the household. Men's rights extended to control of their
wives' behavior and property, including the right to use and dispose of it at will, as well as to
complete control over children and childrearing decisions. Women who defied their husbands
were often threatened not just with divorce and destitution but also with the loss of their
children . . . . It is only recently that father-right has been replaced by the concept of human
rights. The men who go to court today take advantage-consciously or unconsciously-of the
lack offull recognition that women's rights are also human rights. They seek to return to that
time, simpler for them, when men were not only the fathers of their children but of their wives
as well. We now understand, however, that neither women nor children can be treated as
commodities. It is that principle that the law must affirm as a right. [emphasis added]
Kissling, Fatherhood Is Not About Rights, Conscience: Newsjournal of Prochoice Cath. Opinion,
July/Aug. 1988, at 3.
19891
Yale Journal of Law and Feminism
sota, enjoining women from exercising their right to obtain an abortion. 2
None of these orders have withstood appeal,8" but all have involved an
unconstitutional delay in obtaining an abortion for the woman involved.
At least three TRO's have been issued by Indiana courts alone. In one
of the cases, Jane Doe, eighteen years old, was enjoined from obtaining an
abortion by John, a man who had been her boyfriend for only three
months.84 In that case, the court weighed the man's rights of custody and
procreation against the woman's right of privacy. In labeling it the right
to privacy, the court was able to ignore the tremendous loss of liberty and
autonomy involved in the state forcing a woman to undergo unwanted
pregnancy and unwanted parenthood at the request of another. The court
failed to address the question of whether the state could force someone to
be a parent because it viewed Ms. Doe as merely a fetal vessel.
In arriving at his decision, the judge admitted testimony by John re-
garding the most intimate details of Jane's life. Jane refused to testify on
the ground that her reasons for terminating the pregnancy were too per-
sonal and that the court's inquiry was unlawful.
The judge issued an order finding that:
The rights of the father in his unborn children are of constitutional
dimensions under the Fourteenth and Ninth Amendments to the
United States Constitution as well as being derived from the Indiana
common law. Those constitutional rights of the father outweigh the
constitutional rights of the mother, on the basis of the facts found
above in this particular case. 85
The facts that the court found significant in deciding this
case were that:
There is no evidence of harm, medically diagnosed or otherwise, that
would befall the Respondent if she gave birth to the child she now
carries. The appearance and demeanor of the Respondent in the
courtroom, as observed by the Court, indicated that she is a very
pleasant young lady, slender in stature, healthy, and well able to
carry a baby to delivery without an undue burden.88
Although these findings of fact might be more appropriate in a case
involving horses or cows, the court's "facts" and their conclusions of law
that Ms. Doe's ". . . reasons for abortion are indicative of an extremely
82. Johnsen and Paltrow, Boyfriends and Husbands Use Courts to Block Women's Abortions,
Spring/Sum. 1988 Cv. LIBERTIEs, at 7 (available from authors).
83. See e.g., Doe v. Smith, 108 S.Ct. 2136 (1988) (order denying Writ of Injunction).
84. Smith v. Doe, No. 84C01-8804-JP-185 (Ind. Juv. Cir. Ct. Apr. 8, 1988), "rev'd 530 N.E.2d
331 (Ind. Ct. App. 1988) (reversal occurred five months after injunction was granted, during Jane
Doe's second trimester of pregnancy).
85. Id., slip op. at 5.
86. Id., slip op. at 2.
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inmature (sic) young woman which lessens the weight and nature of her
privacy interest,"8 led to an order enjoining Ms. Doe from obtaining an
abortion.
These cases reflect an interpretation of men's procreative rights which
wholly subordinates women and violates any concept of equal citizenship.
The courts completely failed to recognize a woman's fundamental right of
autonomy. Additionally, the court orders are in clear conflict with the Su-
preme Court's ruling in Planned Parenthood of Central Missouri v.
Danforth, in which the Court wrote: "the State cannot delegate to a
spouse a veto power . . . during the first trimester."88 In Danforth, the
Court rejected arguments often raised by fathers' rights advocates, estab-
lishing a simple legal rule for decisionmaking - the woman's choice
prevails:
We recognize, of course, that when a woman, with the approval of
her physician but without the approval of her husband, decides to
terminate her pregnancy, it could be said that she is acting unilater-
ally. The obvious fact is that when the wife and the husband disa-
gree on this decision, the view of only one of the two marriage part-
ners can prevail. Inasmuch as it is the woman who physically bears
the child and who is the more directly and immediately affected by
the pregnancy, as between the two, the balance weighs in her
favor. 89
As the defendant's lawyers in the Doe case stated, we believe:
"The injunction issued by the juvenile court violates not only Doe's
constitutional right to privacy, but also constitutes impermissible sex
discrimination, in violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution .... ",0
The violation of the Equal Protection Clause exists because men and
women are similarly situated with regards to the constitutional right of
autonomy.
It is unlikely that this threat to women's reproductive freedom will soon
disappear. James Bopp, the plaintiff's lawyer in the case of Doe v. Smith,
and general counsel to the National Right to Life Committee, has created
a "Father's Rights Litigation Kit." It contains all the documents needed
to bring a case seeking to enjoin a woman from having an abortion. Mr.
Bopp acknowledges, however, that the Kit avoids the issue of "fetal
rights" because the courts are unlikely to find that argument persuasive,
87. Id., slip op. at 3.
88. 428 U.S. 52, 69 (1976).
89. Id. at 71 (emphasis added).
90. Doe v. Smith Appellant Brief, supra note 63, at 41.
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"as those rights have already been rejected by Roe v. Wade." 91 Yet, the
assumption behind a claim of "fathers' rights" is that the fetus is a person.
Women's reproductive freedom is not only threatened by the attack on
abortion rights, but by an increasing emphasis on non-abortion related
fetal rights. A recent report demonstrates how the new reproductive tech-
nologies raise challenges to reproductive freedom "now that a fetus can be
treated as a patient somehow separate from the woman who is preg-
nant."92 The new reproductive technologies:
. . . raise issues that are especially challenging for feminists who
have had to confront serious questions about whether the cost of
gaining these fertility options may be a loss of reproductive control
for women-a lessening of choice. For the technology also invites
doctors, lawyers, and legislators who assist or regulate non-
traditional birth to intrude on a private and intimate experience.
Some fear that motherhood will be denigrated by dividing its genetic
from its gestational functions and that it will become more difficult,
as a result, for a woman to retain control of her body.93
Fetal rights cases represent a renewed attempt to define and control a
woman's life by her reproductive capacity, as well as an attempt to im-
prison her throughout her pregnancy. They represent the greatest threat
to women's abilities to lead autonomous lives since women won the right
to abortion. Asserting "concern" and personhood for the fetus, the state
and other third parties attempt to control the behavior and lives of the
pregnant women.
94
The fetal rights cases fall into three categories. The first involves "fetal
neglect" where courts have been requested to find the woman either civilly
or criminally liable for her conduct during pregnancy; the second category
involves cases where courts have been requested to authorize certain medi-
cal procedures, such as Cesarean sections, despite the mother's lack of
consent. The third category finds the state "protecting" the fetus without
any request to do so from another party; and the fourth involves cases
where third parties wholly unrelated to the pregnant woman attempt to
intervene in the abortion decision.
Two examples of the first category of cases are People v. Stewart9" and
In re Baby X.9" In October 1986, after her son who was born brain dam-
aged died, Pamela Rae Stewart was charged with medical neglect of her
91. "Introduction to Father's Right's Litigation Kit," Law Firm of Brames, McCormick, Bopp
and Abel. Terre Haute, IN. April 17, 1988, at 2 (on file with author).
92. Editorial, A Womb of One's Own, Ms., May 1988, at 66.
93. Thorn, supra note 12, at 70.
94. Johnsen, A New Threat to Pregnant Women's Autonomy, HASTINGS CENTER REPORT, Aug.
1987, at 34 [hereinafter, New Threat].
95. No. M508197 (Cal. Mun. Ct. Feb. 26, 1987).
96. 97 Mich. App. 111, 293 N.W.2d 736 (1980).
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fetus under a provision of Section 270 of the California Penal Code which
makes it a misdemeanor "to willfully omit to furnish medical attendance
or other remedial care." The prosecution alleged that Ms. Stewart caused
her son's death by taking drugs during pregnancy, engaging in sexual in-
tercourse contrary to doctor's orders and "fail[ing] to seek prompt medical
attention when she experienced bleeding.' 97 Stewart had first gone to the
doctor in her six month of pregnancy. She went to the hospital at least
two times prior to delivery, one time asking that a Cesarean be performed.
She said that the doctor never told her that she had placenta previa, nor
did he explain the seriousness of her condition.9" Ms. Stewart served six
days in jail before a California Municipal State judge dismissed the
charges, finding that the California Legislature had not intended that the
child support statute be used to impose "additional burdens" on women
during pregnancy."
In Michigan, Baby X, a newborn infant suffering from narcotics with-
drawal symptoms, was found to be neglected, based on evidence of the
mother's prenatal "abuse" or "neglect." The court concluded that a child
"has a legal right to begin life with a sound mind and body," 1 ' and that
the court could therefore examine all prenatal conduct bearing on that
neglect. The court ordered the child to be placed in the state's custody. In
Butte County, California, District Attorney Mike Ramsey has adopted a
policy of bringing drug use charges against any woman whose newborn
tests positive for drugs.1"' Earlier this year, Winnebago County, Illinois
State's Attorney Paul Logli charged Melanie Green with involuntary
manslaughter and delivery of a controlled substance to a minor. According
to the coroner, her two-day old baby died of heart failure caused by expo-
sure to cocaine while in the womb. The Winnebago County grand jury
refused to indict on either charge.'0 2
97. People v. Stewart, No. M508197, at 4.
98. Placenta previa is a condition in which the placenta is nearer to the cervix than is the baby.
As a result, the placenta could be stripped away from the uterus with harmful and possibly cata-
strophic effect to the baby, or in premature birth.
99. Bonavoglia, The Ordeal of Pamela Rae Stewart, Ms. July/Aug. 1987, at 92. In response to
Stewart, California Senate Bill 1070 was introduced to extend all child neglect statutes to fetuses. The
bill was offered in committee as an amendment to the Child Abuse Reporting Law. It was defeated in
committee.
100. In re Baby X, 293 N.W.2d at 739.
101. Jost, Mother v. Child, 75 A.B.A. J. 84, 88 (Apr. 1989).
102. Sommerville, Cocaine Babies: Issuefor the Courts? AM. MED. NEWS, June 16, 1989, at 40.
In a related Illinois case, the Illinois Supreme Court found no cause of action by or on behalf of a
fetus, subsequently born alive, against its mother for the unintentional infliction of prenatal injuries.
The court wrote:
It would be a legal fiction to treat the fetus as a separate legal person with rights hostile to
and assertable against its mother. The relationship between a pregnant woman and her fetus is
unlike the relationship between any other plaintiff and defendant. No other plaintiff depends
exclusively on any other defendant for everything necessary for life itself. No other defendant
must go through biological changes of the most profound type, possibly at the risk of her own
life, in order to bring forth an adversary into the world. It is, after all, the whole life of the
pregnant woman which impacts on the development of the fetus. As opposed to the third-party
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Virtually anything a woman might intentionally or unintentionally eat,
drink, or do, even before conception, might negatively affect her fetus. Ad-
ditionally, the state of health of the woman's sexual partner at the time of
conception may affect the fetus, a fact that is ignored in discussions of
"fetal rights." To impose liability for resulting fetal damage (if such cause
and effect could even be proved) would mean that the state can regulate
all manner of conduct before and during a woman's preg-
nancy-restricting her freedom, abridging her constitutional right of au-
tonomy and violating ". . . the right to be let alone . . . the most com-
prehensive of rights and the right most valued by civilized man." '
Additionally, the threat of criminal prosecution or civil liability would
constitute a powerful weapon available to the state "and to all men to use
against their partners both during and after pregnancy."'
Surely, if there is any meaning at all to the right of autonomy, it in-
cludes the right to choose how to conduct oneself as to the daily matters of
eating, drinking and movement without fears of government regulation
and government reprisal.105 Without such a right, the woman "would be
held liable for any behavior during pregnancy having potentially adverse
affects on her fetus."' " Implicit in Roe v. Wade is the assumption that it
is more appropriate for women, rather than the state, to make procreative
decisions." By regulating a woman's conduct during pregnancy, the court
assumes that the person who is in fact best qualified to make decisions,
both for herself and for the fetus, does not have the ability to do so.
To allow the state to assume the role of protector of fetal interests poses
the anomalous situation of the fetus as an adversary of the pregnant wo-
defendant, it is the mother's every waking and sleeping moment which, for better or worse,
shapes the prenatal environment which forms the world for the developing fetus. That this is
so is not a pregnant woman's fault: it is a fact of life."
Stallman v. Youngquist, 125 Ill.2d 267, 531 N.E.2d 355, 360 (1988).
The Court also wrote that:
Judicial scrutiny into the day-to-day lives of pregnant women would involve an unprecedented
intrusion into the privacy and autonomy of the citizens of this State ....
In holding that no cause of action will lie for maternal prenatal negligence, this court
emphasizes that we in no way minimize the public policy favoring healthy newborns. Pregnant
women need access to information about the risks inherent in everyday living on a developing
fetus and need access to health care for themselves and their developing fetuses. It is, after all,
to a pregnant women's advantage to do all she can within her knowledge and power to bring a
healthy child into this world. The way to effectuate the birth of healthy babies is not, however,
through after-the-fact civil liability in tort for individual mothers, but rather through before-
the-fact education of all women and families about prenatal development.
Id. at 361.
103. Olmstead, 277 U.S. at 478.
104. Johnsen, New Threat, supra note 94, at 37.
105. Note, Maternal Rights and Fetal Wrongs: The Case Against The Criminalization of "Fetal
Abuse," 101 HARV. L. REv. 994, 1010 (1988).
106. Johnsen, The Creation of Fetal Rights: Conflicts with Women's Constitutional Rights to
Liberty, Privacy and Equal Protection, 95 YALE L.J. 599, 606 (1986).
107. L. TRIBE, supra note 21, at 1352.
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man. 08 As more than one commentator has pointed out, such a situation
serves neither the best interest of the woman nor of the fetus.1"9 The im-
position of criminal sanctions is more likely to deter women from seeking
medical aid than to deter harmful conduct. If the state is truly interested
in promoting the health of the fetus, one option would be to provide ade-
quate medical services to all pregnant women. 0
Resorting to the law to monitor pregnant women's actions could even
encourage women to choose contraception or abortion if the alterna-
tive were criminal prosecution, civil liability, or more direct coercion,
such as institutionalization during pregnancy or a forced Cesarean
section.'
Further, state regulation would virtually imprison pregnant women, treat-
ing them as lesser citizens because they are pregnant, and violating their
constitutional right of autonomy.
The second area of fetal rights cases also substantially encroaches on a
woman's right of autonomy, both with regard to her decision making ca-
pacity and her bodily integrity. Two cases illustrating this latter category
are Jefferson v. Griffin Spaulding County Hospital Authority"' and In
re A.C. I" In Jefferson, a woman in her 39th week of pregnancy exper-
ienced a complete placenta previa. It was virtually impossible for this con-
dition to correct itself prior to delivery. According to her physician, there
was a 99 percent chance the child would not survive a natural delivery
and a 50 percent chance the mother would not survive. The mother re-
fused, based on religious grounds, to have her baby delivered by Cesarean
section. The court ordered that the Cesarean be performed if the physi-
108. Note, supra note 105, at 1009.
109. Johnsen, New Threat, supra, note 94 at 35; Note, supra note 105, at 1009.
110. An alternative approach to improving prenatal care is available that does not involve the
many drawbacks of creating legal conflicts between the pregnant woman and her fetus. We can treat
the woman and the fetus as a single entity, recognizing that a pregnant woman already has a great
stake in promoting the well-being of the fetus she carries. Our interest in helping the fetus, and
thereby the future child, could thus be furthered by helping the pregnant woman. Johnsen, New
Threat, supra note 94, at 39.
In the first nationwide hospital study, conducted by the National Association for Perinatal Addic-
tion Research and Education (NAPARE), it was found that at least 11% of pregnant women had
used one or more illegal drugs, with 75% of them using cocaine. The president of NAPARE, Dr. Ira
J. Chasnoff, states that ". .. prosecution would exacerbate the problems caused by the deficiency in
medical care for poor, pregnant women. 'America has one of the highest rates of infant mortality in
the developed world, primarily because of a lack of access to health care'. . . . [Tihis is a medical issue
that has been turned into a legal issue." Somerville, supra note 102, at 41. See also Reardon, Baby's
Cocaine Death Adds to Debate on Protection of the Unborn, Chic. Trib. May 14, 1989, at Cl;
Besharov, Crack Babies: The Worst Threat is Morn Herself, Wash. Post, Aug. 6, 1989, at BI.
111. Johnsen, New Threat, supra note 94, at 36. Illinois State Senator Richard Kelly, an abor-
tion opponent, and a proponent of legislation requiring civil action against mothers for injuries due to
illegal drug use while pregnant, will not introduce such legislation because of his fear that such a law
would lead to more abortions. Marcotte, Crime and Pregnancy, 75 A.B.A. J. 14, 16 (Aug. 1989).
112. 247 Ga. 86, 274 S.E.2d 457 (1981).
113. 533 A.2d 611 (D.C. 1987), vacated, 539 A.2d 203 (1988).
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cian found it necessary to sustain the life of the child. Citing Roe, the
court stated that "a viable unborn child has the right under the U.S. Con-
stitution to the protection of the State through such statutes prohibiting
the arbitrary termination of the life of an unborn fetus."114 The court also
directed that temporary custody of the unborn child be awarded to the
State of Georgia Department of Human Resources."'
In another example of forced surgery, on June 16, 1987, George Wash-
ington University Hospital sought a court order to compel a woman ter-
minally ill with leukemia to undergo a Cesarean section to deliver a
twenty-six week old fetus."' The mother was heavily sedated and seemed
to vacillate on the issue of consent, although when last asked, she stated,
"I don't want it done.""' 7 No one, including A.C.'s physician, her hus-
band, or her mother wanted this surgery forced upon A.C. The District
Court ordered the Cesarean, basing its decision on its belief that A.C.
would not survive a significant time after the surgery and that the fetus
had a chance of survival if taken prior to A.C.'s death. The Appeals
Court, in upholding the trial court's order held that: "The Cesarean sec-
tion would not significantly affect A.C.'s condition because she had, at
best, two days left of sedated life.""'  The fetus, on the other hand, had a
chance of surviving delivery, despite the possibility it would be born hand-
icapped. The Cesarean was performed and the child died hours after
birth. The mother died two days after the operation. However, as Barbara
Ehrenreich points out, in a sense, A.C. had already disappeared, "reduced
from a woman with an identity and options to a set of initials-little more
than an 'address' for a fetus."" 9 This image of the fetus as a "freestand-
ing life form" not only distorts the fetus, but eliminates the woman. 20
By "eliminating" the woman, these decisions violate the right of bodily
integrity which is implicit in the right of privacy and explicit both in the
common law and Fourth Amendment cases. 2 ' Common law has long rec-
ognized that an individual has the right to be free from nonconsensual
invasions of bodily integrity. The Supreme Court has also held that the
Constitution, particularly the Fourth Amendment, protects the individ-
ual's right to bodily integrity. Included in the Fourth Amendment cases
are Rochin v. California,'22 (forcible pumping of a suspect's stomach vio-
lates the individual's Fourteenth Amendment due process rights) and
114. Jefferson, 274 S.E.2d at 458.
115. Subsequent to the court order, Ms. Jefferson vaginally delivered a healthy baby. See Annas,
Forced Cesareans: The Most Unkind Cut of All, 12 HASTINGS CENTER REP. 16 (1982).
116. In re A.C., 533 A.2d at 611.
117. Id. at 613.
118. Id. at 617.
119. Ehrenreich, The Heart of the Matter, Ms., May 1988, at 20.
120. Id.
121. For a comprehensive discussion of these issue, see Gallagher, Prenatal Invasions and Inter-
ventions: What's Wrong with Fetal Rights, 10 HARV. WOMEN'S L. J. 9 (1987).
122. 342 U.S. 165 (1952).
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more recently, Winston v. Lee'" (removal of a bullet from a suspect's
body against his will violates his Fourth Amendment rights). The Su-
preme Court held that, ". . . the overriding function of the Fourth
Amendment is to protect personal privacy and integrity against unwar-
ranted intrusion by the State."" 4 If suspects in a crime are accorded such
strong constitutional protection of their bodily integrity, pregnant women
must be accorded at least these protections.
These fetal rights cases conflict with the general common law principle
that there is no duty to come to the rescue of another.12 This common
law principle is routinely upheld by courts, even where a case involves a
relative's only chance of survival. In McFall v. Shimp, Mr. Shimp was
not required to donate bone marrow to save his cousin's life. 2 The fetal
rights cases conflict with this principle, again by ignoring or undervaluing
the extent of the intrusion and deprivation of liberty involved for the preg-
nant woman. If A.C. had been a man with only two days left to live, it is
highly unlikely that the court would have ordered that he undergo any
kind of operation to save the life of another, no matter what his relation to
that person might have been. Yet, A.C. was forced to undergo surgery so
that the state could attempt to save a fetus. The courts cannot constitu-
tionally order pregnant women to "rescue" fetuses.
These cases also conflict with Roe and subsequent cases on a number of
other grounds. As discussed earlier, the state's compelling interest in the
health of the mother always overrides its interest in the fetus. 27 Further-
more, these cases "treat the maternal-fetal relationship as it does conflicts
between two distinct and independent entities,""' obscuring the fact that
the fetus, until born, is part of the woman. It is not a separate person,
either biologically or legally.' 29
Conceptualizing the fetus as separate from the pregnant woman has led
to the third category of cases in which the state acts as "protector" of the
fetus, without any request to do so from another party. In Washington,
D.C., Brenda A. Vaughan, a first-time offender convicted of second-
degree theft, was locked up in a jail until her baby was born even though
the prosecutor had agreed to probation. Having tested positive for cocaine
use when she came before Associate Judge Peter Wolf of the D.C. Supe-
rior Court, he said, "I'm going to keep her locked up until the baby is
born because she's (sic) tested positive for cocaine when she came before
123. 470 U.S. 753 (1985).
124. Id. at 760 (quoting Schmerber v. California 384 U.S. 757, 767 (1966)).
125. See Gallagher, supra note 121, at 25. See also L. TRIBE, supra note 20, at 1354.
126. 127 Pitts. Leg. J. 14 (Allegheny County July 26, 1978).
127. The Webster plurality failed to address the effect of finding a compelling state interest in the
fetus throughout pregnancy. Such a compelling interest would eliminate entirely women's constitu-
tional right to reproductive privacy.
128. Johnsen, New Threat, supra note 94, at 35.
129. Roe, 410 U.S. at 158.
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me . . . .She's apparently an addictive personality and I'll be darned if
I'm going to have her baby born that way."' 30 Vaughan was released on
September 14, 1988, the day before the baby was due, after receiving two
sentence reductions in an early-release program that takes effect when
prisons are too crowded.
Ms. Vaughan was sentenced to jail, not because she passed bad checks,
but because she was pregnant. She was not being punished for her crime,
but for her status as a pregnant woman. Lynn Paltrow, counsel for the
ACLU Reproductive Freedom Project, called the sentence "contrary to
common sense and the Constitution," adding that, "prison is the last place
you want to put somebody who needs good health care.""'Si
Lastly, in the fourth category of cases, a man requested guardianship of
his comatose, pregnant wife for the purposes of authorizing an abortion he
believed (with doctor's advice) might improve her chances of recovery.? 2
Two anti-abortion activists who had never even met the Klein family
sought to intervene and prevent the abortion. Relying in part on Roe, a
New York appellate court ruled that "these absolute strangers to the
Klein family, whatever their motivation, have no place in the midst of this
family's tragedy."' 3
Chillingly, all of these threats to women's reproductive freedom are not
receding. The Webster decision reveals that the Supreme Court is increas-
ingly willing to define the fetus as separate from the mother, with sepa-
rate rights. Justice Rehnquist stated that " . . . we do not see why the
State's interest in protecting potential human life should come into exis-
tence only at the point of viability, and that there should therefore be a
rigid line allowing state regulation after viability but prohibiting before
viability."'" A finding of a compelling state interest from the moment of
conception would legitimate radical intrusions on a woman's autonomy.
Abortion restrictions, father's rights and fetal rights cases reveal the in-
adequacy of the privacy right, as applied, to allow women to act autono-
mously in decisions affecting their bodies and lives. The doctrine of equal
protection has also failed to guarantee an equal right of autonomy. Preg-
nancy cannot be permitted to limit or deny women's access to the respect,
dignity and constitutional rights guaranteed to all citizens.
V. AUTONOMY ANALYSIS
At the heart of the issues surrounding a woman's access to abortion and
her ability to decide how and when to have children remains the fight for
130. Churchville, D.C. Judge Jails Woman As Protection For Fetus, Wash. Post, July 23, 1988,
at Al.
131. Moss, Pregnant? Go Directly to Jail, 74 A.B.A. J. 20 (1988).
132. In re Klein, No. 1736-89, (N.Y. App. Div. Feb. 1989).
133. Id., slip op. at 4.
134. Webster, 109 S.Ct. at 3057.
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control over decision-making. Women must be able "to choose their roles
in a male-dominated society,"' 5 and their procreative decisions must be-
long only to them. These decisions cannot be made by doctors, judges,
courts, husbands, lovers, boyfriends or any other third party. It is not they
who will be deprived of autonomy."3 6
In order to enable women to function as full members of society, the
courts must recognize that their current applications of the privacy doc-
trine and equal protection analysis restrict women's constitutional right of
autonomy, which includes the rights of bodily integrity and self-
determination. The courts must broaden their application of these doc-
trines through use of an autonomy analysis which recognizes that women
need reproductive freedom in order to have the same opportunity to deter-
mine the course of their lives as men. This analysis provides a framework
for articulating the rights of pregnant women and for weighing when the
state may restrict those rights, whatever is put in balance on the other side
of the equation. A fundamental right of autonomy requires the use of
heightened scrutiny when evaluating restrictions on women's reproductive
freedom. For instance, under our analysis, the courts would be unable to
ignore the potential restriction fetal rights legislation places on a woman's
constitutional right of autonomy. The state would bear the burden of
proving that such legislation is necessary to serve a compelling state inter-
est and that there is no less drastic alternative. By using heightened scru-
tiny, very few restrictions on a woman's autonomy would be found
constitutional.
The autonomy analysis would require that the courts use heightened
scrutiny even under an equal protection claim. Such a claim would re-
quire higher scrutiny than the Supreme Court's current analysis, which
incorrectly emphasizes the biological differences between men and women
instead of the similar autonomy rights shared by the sexes. The Court
must recognize that men and women are similarly situated with regards to
the autonomy right and are constitutionally required to have equal access
to it.
Without heightened scrutiny, our legal system will continue to burden
women in a way that was found to be unlawful in Nashville Gas Co. v.
Satty.'17 The burden we suffer is solely because of our sex.
VI. CONCLUSION
Although women are being "fit into" a male "modeled" legal system,
there are existing constitutional protections, which if applied correctly by
135. Karst, supra note 32, at 58 n.325.
136. Justice Douglas wrote that involuntary pregnancy and childbirth would "deprive a woman
of her preferred lifestyle and force upon her a radically different and undesired future." Bolton, 410
U.S. at 214 (1973) (concurring).
137. 434 U.S. 136 (1977).
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the courts, would help ensure that women have reproductive freedom. An
autonomy analysis reveals that restrictions on women's reproductive free-
dom violate fundamental due process rights and equal protection. If courts
continue to evaluate women's claims to reproductive freedom without un-
derstanding the autonomy right, they will continue to unconstitutionally
treat "women solely as reproductive vessels whose decisions and autonomy
are so undeserving of respect that women may not even control if and
when they reproduce."1 8
138. Doe v. Smith Appellant Brief, supra note 63, at 43.
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